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Abstract:
This study utilizes Robert Putnam’s “Two Level Game Theory” to understand whether
public opinion influenced President Obama's first-term administration when confronted with
foreign policy decisions. Some scholars argue that there is an overall lack in understanding of
how public opinion affects American foreign policy because the public is disengaged and
uneducated on foreign issues and that the role of media influences the public’s attitude towards a
certain issue. Accordingly, it is hypothesized here that public opinion was not a factor in this
process. To test this proposition, the study evaluates three cases: the “closing” of Guantanamo
Bay, the United States’ intervention in Libya, and the continuation of the drone program.
Throughout each case, multiple variables are examined including: public opinion of the citizens
and the political elite, President Obama’s political communication, and international diplomatic
actions. Findings indicate that public opinion did not play any major role in President Obama’s
foreign policy decision-making process; therefore, President Obama’s policies did not meet
Robert Putnam’s criteria of domestic influence in the two level game theory.
When looking at the results of the three cases that were examined in the study, it is safe
to say that the results were inconclusive because only two of the three cases met the expectations
of the hypothesis. The cases of Guantanamo Bay and the intervention in Libya supported the
hypothesis because even though public opinion was strongly against closing the prison and
getting involved in the war in Libya, the Obama Administration continuously pursued its support
for these policies regardless of the public’s opinion and desires. With the drone program, there
was strong support from the public for using and continuing the drone program in fighting
terrorism. Therefore, the drone program is the only case where the support from the domestic
level aligned with the support from the international level, as predicted by Robert Putnam’s two
level game theory.

There is a worldwide perception that the United States plays the role of the “anchor of
global security” which makes the U.S. government feel compelled to remain dominant in
international policy. However, it is not always necessarily clear as to what influences the United
States’ foreign policy. There is this belief that the United States government is responsible for
making its decision based off of both public opinion and diplomatic beliefs and opinions but can
the government do both? This study argues that public opinion in not as important when it comes
to President Obama’s foreign policy decision-making process and that the government seems to
make their decisions because they feel that they feel pressured to get involved due to
international pressure from other countries or international organizations.
There have been many different theories that have evolved since the introduction of
research on public opinion and how it influences not only domestic policy but also, foreign
policy. There has also been much speculation of if public opinion even has an influence on the
political elites who are in charge of policy making. Henry Durant and Kenneth Younger in the
mid 1900s were two pioneers who pushed for there to be more research to fill the gaps in
determining public opinion’s influence on domestic and foreign policies.
Henry Durant was one of the foundational theorists to look at the link between both
public opinion and policy making. In Durant’s article “Public Opinion, Polls and Foreign Policy”
(1955), he argued that public opinion must be looked at in order to determine why there was such
a gap between foreign and domestic policies. Durant also noticed that the “general will” or the
public opinion was only believed to apply to domestic issues and not foreign issues. There is one
argument that he makes in this article that can still be seen today and that is the lack of
knowledge the public has on foreign issues. In his article he mentions that one third of the
population polled knew nothing of the issue they were voting on, one third of the polled

population was aware of the issue but could not be considered informed on the issue, and one
third of the polled population consistently showed knowledge on the issues at hand (1955).
Overall, even though Durant’s article was a relevant issue in the mid 1950s it is an argument that
is outdated today. However, his article and argument can still be used as the foundation for the
growing research on public opinion and policymaking issues.
Kenneth Younger had similar ideas to Henry Durant, both of who were writing in the mid
1950s. In Younger’s article “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy” (1955), he argues that foreign
policy in Britain had remained somewhat oligarchic unlike domestic policies, meaning that
foreign policy remained more distant from ordinary people while domestic policy remained more
immediate to the people. Younger gives a personal anecdote saying that he was a minister in the
Foreign Office and when he had switched from the Home Office in Britain to the Foreign Office
he was surprised to see how little their decisions were influenced by the public however, he
believes that the government subconsciously tends to lean toward the general will of the people
(1955). Much like Durant, Younger’s argument may have been relevant at the time his article
was published but this article is one that is also outdated. It can be seen today in Britain, British
citizens have more opportunities to be involved in foreign policy decisions and the peoples’
opinions are heard when it comes to these foreign policy decisions, for example, “Brexif’. Great
Britain held a referendum where their citizens got to decide whether or not to leave the European
Union and when the vote came back “yes” the government and the European Union began
working on ways to leave the international organization, listening to the people’s opinion.
However, even if this article is outdated, it can also be used as a foundation for the growing
research in this field.
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The influence of public opinion on policy making can be broken down into two separate
fields: influences of public opinion on domestic policy and then on foreign policy. First, it might
be beneficial to look at the theories some scholars have used to determine how or even if public
opinion has any weight in domestic policymaking. In Fay L. Cook, Jason Barabas, and Benjamin
I. Page’s paper, titled “Invoking Public Opinion: Policy Elites and Social Security” (2002), they
attempt to argue that policy elites do refer to public opinion; elites often refer to opinion
specifically in a manner that hints at the balance of opinion on certain issues; and that policy
elites’ references to public opinion are normally backed by and not inconsistent with survey
evidence and results. However, in the end the authors experienced mixed results. Throughout the
article they use democratic theory and median voter theorem as their theories in order to support
their research on the topic of how public opinion has influenced public policy, specifically social
security between the years 1993 and 1999 (2002). Democratic Theory is the notion that the idea
of the population’s participation has a minimal role in politics and that it is dangerous for the
wide popular population to participate in politics (Pateman 1970). While the Median Voter
Theorem is that each individual in a group attempts to maximize their own power- each
individual wants to benefit the most and sometimes this behavior results in the median voter
being able to cast the decisive vote in a contest (Poulette).
In Paul Burstein’s article “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and
an Agenda” (2003), he argues that there is a big gap in the knowledge of how public opinion
influences public policy and that such gaps will need to be addressed in future research.
Burstein’s results show that his hypothesis is correct; first he finds that public opinion does affect
policy but only three quarters of the time that the impact is measured. Second, salience does
affect the impact of public opinion on policy. Third, the impact of public opinion on policy is
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substantial when interest organizations, political parties, and elites are taken into account;
however, the scarcity of data on interest organizations and elites needs caution when interpreting
the results of such data. Fourth, government responsiveness to the public cannot be rejected
because there is little evidence, however the evidence does not support his hypothesis. Fifth, the
ability to generalize about the impact of opinion on policy is bargained by the slim focus of
available work (2003). This argument of Burstein’s can be used to show the problems with using
public opinion as a theory and also as an error in my research and results.
While Burstein showed that there are pieces of the puzzle missing when it comes to the
impact of public opinion on policymaking there are also scholars who believe that domestic
policies are not influenced by public opinion. Scholars François Petry and Matthew Mendelsohn
in their article “Public Opinion and Policy Making in Canada: 1994-2001” (2004) argue that
there is an obvious dilemma of the supposed attention that public opinion and the lack of
correlation between policy and public opinion during Jean Chrétien’s administration, which they
believe is caused by ideological differences between the public and the government. Their results
show that there was a lack of change in policy during the more liberal government of President
Chrétien because the former president Mulroney was conservative and the public opinion tended
to lean more conservative, therefore making the Chrétien government less responsive to opinion
(2004).
Just like with domestic policy and public opinion, there are numerous articles that support
or deny the idea that the public is influential in foreign policy decision making; so here are a
couple of articles that support the argument that public opinion influences foreign policy. In
Douglas Foyle’s article “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating
Variable” (1997), he argues that public opinion’s influence on foreign policy varies due to
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numerous factors including decision time and type of issue under consideration. In his article, he
examines decision maker beliefs about public opinion in the two following areas: (1) normative
beliefs and (2) practical beliefs. His results show that beliefs can be a variable of influence in
public opinion on foreign policy decision making; it also showed that this extends to the
presidential level and as with lower level officials, beliefs defined the conditions under which
decision makers felt that the opinion of the public was relevant to policy making (1997).
Scholars T. Knecht and M.S. Weatherford argued in their article “Public Opinion and
Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making” (2006), that Presidents and their
policy making teams do not have a blank card but unless there is high demand from the public on
an issue then the administration has looser constraints on their foreign policy decisions; however,
the salience of foreign policy issues to the public is important because officials that are elected
are more likely to give closer consideration to the potential impact it will have on their chances
of election if the public is more attentive to foreign policy issues. In their results, they show that
the immediacy of international issues and the action taken by the President in their decision
process influences public attentiveness; and that international crises receive more attention by the
public and here the presidents have the potential to help give the public knowledge of the
national interest (2006). They show that presidents and elected officials are more likely to pay
attention and listen to public opinion because their election or re-election depends on the public.
Mark Weisbrot mentions in his article, “Commentary: Obama’s Latin America Policy:
Continuity Without Change” (2011), that President Barack Obama may be listening public
opinion when it comes down to more well covered topics for example with the war in Iraq and
Afghanistan. However, when it comes to Latin America, the region is typically not the main
focus of the public and does not get as much attention. Weisbrot also says that President Obama
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and his administration tend to focus more on what the media thinks about their decision-making.
(2011).

The following articles do not show that public opinion has a substantial influence on
foreign policy, in J.A. Murray and Lawrence Leduc’s article “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
Options in Canada” (1976-1977), they want to explore if the climate of opinion in Canada on the
idea of economic nationalism and some specific aspects of the third option in Canadian foreign
policy. The third option in Canada is know as the idea of being less dependent economically on
the United States and leaning closer to European and Asian countries (1976-1977). In their
results, they found that there is an increasing mood of economic nationalism in Canada today but
this increasing desire has not been overwhelming enough to cause changes in the country’s
foreign policy (1976-1977). They show that regardless of increasing desire from the public, the
government has done nothing to take their opinions into consideration more than likely because
partnering and remaining close economically to the United States is in Canada’s best interest.
In Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz’s article “Defining the American Public
Opinion/ Foreign Policy Nexus” (1998), they argued that there is an overall lack in
understanding of how public opinion affects American foreign policy making. They argue that
the public is disengaged and uneducated on foreign issues and that the role of media influences
the public’s attitude towards a certain issue. In their conclusion, their overall main point is that
there needs to be more research and studies done on the topic (1998). They believe that not
enough research has been done on the connection between public opinion and its influence on
foreign policy making and that it will need to be something that is addressed in future research.
In the article “Dangerous Complacencies: Obama, Latin America, and the
Misconceptions of Power” (2011), the author mentions that President Obama did not really listen

6

to anyone outside of his administration and that the foreign policy towards Latin America at this
time was mainly in the interest of big business. Meaning that foreign policy decisions were made
in Latin America based off of corporate capital like natural resources, cheap labor and etc. and
there is no mention of what public opinion had to say about policy in Latin America. (2011).
In an article written by Michael C. Desch, “The More Things Change, the More They
Stay the Same: The Liberal Tradition and Obama’s Counterterrorism Policy” (2010) he uses Jack
Goldsmith’s ideas to say that there is a continuity in counterterrorism policies between
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. To explain one of the reasons for this continuity
he uses the bureaucratic politics theory, which is the idea that where you sit as a president will
also determine where you stand in your increasing presidential authority. Another aspect that
shows that President Obama focus on the administrations’ beliefs rather than public opinion is
that in the article Desch states that there was a broad agreement among the country’s political
elite that there was widespread, inevitable fear post September 11 that requires new measures in
order to survive. (2010).
When it comes to studying President Obama’s foreign policy and how it is influenced by
public opinion, it is necessary to look at what questions researchers tend to ask the public. In
Richard C. Eichenberg’s article “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Obama Era” (2009),
he writes that President Obama came into presidential office with higher than normal approval
ratings from the public and while overtime they may have decreased, the public remains to have
high confidence in President Obama’s decision making. Throughout the article he gives tables
that show the outcomes of polls and the public is broken down into three categories: democrats,
republicans, and independents. There are two tables in the article relevant to Obama’s foreign
policy and they ask the public about various policies and concerns: to rank which tasks should be
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the top priority for the American leader, relations with Europe and National security issues.
(2009).
However, when it comes to public opinion on President Obama’s foreign policy making
there are some instances where President Obama does not seem to follow what the public wants.
Eichenberg gives an example about the War in Iraq and Afghanistan where a majority of the
public wanted a decrease in the amount of United States troops stationed in these countries but
President Obama instead increased the number of troops there not only once but twice and both
times there was majority support from the public once President Obama made the decision. This
example shows Eichenberg’s idea that even though the public may not always agree with the
dilemma; they tended to have high confidence in President Obama’s decision-making skills.
(2009).
In Robert D. Putnam’s article “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of TwoLevel Games” (1988), he focuses his paper on creating a conceptual framework for
understanding how diplomacy and domestic politics interact with one another. Putnam settles on
the two-level game theory meaning that politics of many international negotiations can be seen
as a two-level game. He states that at the national level, domestic groups will pursue their
interests by putting pressure on the government to support more favorable policies to the public
and the politicians will look for power by creating coalitions amongst these groups; while at the
international level, governments look to increase and maximize their ability to satisfy domestic
pressures, while they decrease or minimize the consequences of foreign developments. Putnam
also states “any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may
upset the game boars, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the
domestic table risks being evicted from his seat” (1988).
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For my research, I will use Robert D. Putnam’s Two-Level Game theory and argue that
public opinion has not had an influence in President Obama’s foreign policy decision-making
process, therefore making his theory incorrect in certain cases. Putnam expects that the domestic
level of the two level game will ratify and support the decisions made at the international level,
therefore benefiting both levels of the game since both the domestic and the international levels
would be receiving what they bargained for. The domestic level of the game is responsible for
ratifying what the international level decides on and negotiates and Putnam argues that it will
happen because the president’s administration is committed to both the domestic and
international sectors (1988). However, this is not always the case.

Hypothesis and Variables:
This study will answer the following question: what influenced President Barack
Obama’s foreign policy decision-making process throughout his first term? This study will
evaluate three different foreign policies: the “closing” of Guantanamo Bay, intervention in
Libya, and the expansion of the drone program. When President Obama was making these
decisions, it is evident that he did not follow public opinion and therefore this tends to leave what
influenced his decision-making process lean towards international pressure. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that public opinion was not a major factor in President Obama’s process.
Throughout each case, multiple variables are examined including: public opinion of both
the citizens and the political elite, President Obama’s political communication, and international
diplomatic actions. It is imperative to look at what the Obama administration said their intentions
were for making these foreign policy decisions because readers need background as to what the
administration told the public what these policies focused on and how they would be benflcial to
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the public. Therefore, statements made by the administration about the policies could have had
an impact on the public’s opinions on the policies, which are reflected in the public opinion
polls. However, when looking at international pressure it is important to take into consideration
why international actors chose to support the United States in their operations and who was
pressuring to who to get or not get involved in these cases.
The most important variable to my research is the statistics that were gathered from the
public opinion polls. These numbers will show either support or opposition to the arguments
made by President Obama and his administration. If the numbers prove to be consistent with the
arguments and the policies put in place by the administration then the proposed hypothesis will
be deemed incorrect. However, if the numbers are inconsistent with the arguments and policies
put in place by the administration then the hypothesis will be correct. Then, there will be an
analysis of the international actors that were involved and supported the United States’
ambitions. Were these countries feeling pressured to join in on the side of the United States or
was the United States feeling pressured to join other countries in their actions?

Cases:
“Closing” of Guantanamo Bay
The United States began the construction of Guantanamo Bay in 1903 when Cuba agreed
to lease approximately 45 square miles of land in Guantánamo Bay in order for the United States
to construct a naval station. Originally the prison was used as a migrant detention facility but
after the September 11, 2001 attacks and military operations in Afghanistan, this facility was
repurposed to hold suspected terrorist detainees. President George W. Bush’s administration said
that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay were not on US soil and in turn were not covered by the
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US Constitution and because they were seen as “enemy combatants” meant that some legal
protections could be denied to the detainees. (CNN Library 2016a).
During the 2008 Presidential campaigns, then-presidential candidate Barack Obama made
a campaign promise to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay within one year of him taking office
(Sekulow 2016). Soon after President Obama was inaugurated in 2009, he signed an executive
order to close down the facility (CNN Library 2016a) however; it is now eight years later and
GITMO is still open and holding detainees. It is still open today because President Obama has
faced major opposition in Congress about the transportation of detainees and the overall closing
of the facility because Congress believes that this would harm the U.S.’ national security rather
than doing it any good.
President Obama has claimed time and time again that the Guantanamo Bay prison
should be closed because it undermines the national security and interest of justice of the United
States (Obama 2009) and that it is counterproductive in the U.S.’ fight against terrorists. Along
with this idea, the claim has also been made that Guantanamo Bay has been used as propaganda
by terrorists seeking new recruits. President Obama says that not only has it undermine US
national security but it has also undermined the United States’ foreign policy and the US’
partnerships with allies and other countries that the US needs in order to fight terrorism.
Keeping Guantanamo open also drained military resources, with approximately $450 million
spent in 2015 to keep the facility open and more than $200 million in additional costs to keep it
running in the future (Garunay 2016) and also it has been very costly the United States
taxpayers. (Obama 2009).
Juliette Kayyem, a CNN National Security Analyst, agreed with President Obama’s
reasoning. Kayyem stated that while Guantanamo Bay may have made sense during 2002, now
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Guantanamo’s purpose has run its course. Kayyem claimed that while the idea of closing the
Guantanamo prison has transformed from a decision that seemed impossible to one that has
become more manageable because as of now, eight years later, there are less than one hundred
detainees left to be transported from the prison. She also stated that Obama’s consistent pressure
for the closure of the prison has turned Guantanamo from propaganda for terrorism into
something that is far less powerful. (2016).
However, while President Obama has continuously said that his decision to close
Guantanamo Bay is what is best for the nation’s national security and so on, others do not
believe that that is the case. Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton stated that President Obama is
continuing with his campaign to close the prison at Guantanamo to protect his political legacy,
which Senator Cotton believes to be a grave mistake that would harm the U.S.’ national security
because the prison’s closure could be used as propaganda for radical Islamists. Senator Cotton
also says that he had the opportunity to visit Guantanamo Bay in 2015. According to his
experiences, the prison is nothing as barbaric as President Obama makes it seem to the public.
The International Red Cross can and has visited the facilities multiple times and so have other
international human-rights groups. Detainees have also received equivalent medical care as the
guards and have been able to participate in their daily prayer sessions. (2016).
Senator Cotton claimed that Guantanamo Bay has allowed the United States government
to extract important intelligence from detainees that have helped stop plots against Americans.
For example, he mentioned that information was obtained from detainees at the prison which
was lead information used in the mission to find and kill Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Sen. Cotton
made the claim that by closing the prison this is the kind of information that the government
would miss out on. He took into consideration what has happened to detainees once they have
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been released from the facilities. He gave the readers an example of the release of Mullah Abdul
Rauf in 2007, who was a former commander for the Taliban. After his release from the prison, he
became a “warlord” in southern Afghanistan and pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant and led groups of insurgent fighters. In 2016 United States forces
encountered Rauf once again but this time he was killed. Well over 650 detainees have been
released from the prison and out of that number 196 former detainees have been confirmed or
suspected of returning to the battlefield. (2016).
The last example that Senator Cotton gave was of a detainee who was released from
Guantanamo Bay in early January 2016, Mahmud Umar Muhammad Bin Atef. Upon his release
from the prison Atef made statements that referenced to how all Americans should die because
that is part of Allah’s rules. Atef threatened to look up the names and faces of the guards from
Guantanamo and sneak into their homes and “cut their throats like sheep” (2016). Sen. Cotton
used these examples to show how the closure of Guantanamo Bay would be harmful to the
United States’ national security and contradictory to the idea that the government is supposed to
provide protection to its citizens. (2016).
Jay Sekulow of Fox News believed quite the opposite. Sekulow writes that President
Obama has his own “politically motivated desires” (2016) ahead of the United States’ national
security and Sekulow said that his decision to close the prison is nothing but President Obama
and his legacy, nothing else. Sekulow believed that nothing was more important to President
Obama than keeping this campaign promise and maintaining his legacy. (2016).
Joe Nocera from the New York Times wrote about how President Obama gave the public
the impression that some things are worth fighting for but Nocera made the argument that the
president gives the impression that that’s what President Obama has believed while he has really
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done nothing to act on that belief. Nocera said that Obama has blamed the failure to close
Guantanamo prison on the laws that Congress passed on transferring detainees. However, he
stated that the president could have jumped through hoops to go around these laws but the
president never tried. Instead, President Obama froze all transfers of inmates who were eligible
and had been cleared for transfer to other countries. Nocera explained that the government said
that there was no national security interest in holding these men. Yet Obama continued to let
them rot in that Cuban hell.” (2013).
When President Obama made the decision to sign an executive order to begin the process
of closing the Guantanamo Bay prison, did he use public opinion to guide his decision making
process? Numerous public opinion polls show that the American public was opposed to closing
the Guantanamo Bay prison and moving some of the detainees to United States prisons, therefore
showing us that the president did not take public opinion much into consideration. In the
following poll released by Gallup shows readers that over half of the American public does not
favor the closing of Guantanamo Bay and transferring the detainees to the United States while
only thirty percent of the American public does agree with this decision (Newport 2009).
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As you may know, since 2001, the United States has held peoplefrom other
countries who are suspected of being terrorists in a prison at Guantanamo
Bay in Cuba. Do you think the United States should —or should not —close
this ptisan and move some of the prisoners to U.S. prisons?
%

Yes, should

% No opinion

% No, should not

65%

64%

32%

30%
5%

3%

2009 Nov 20-22

2009 May 29-31

GALLUP

Figure 1: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup on the decision to close Guantanamo
Bay and move the detainees to United States prisons.
A second graph from Gallup shows the numbers broken down into the publics’ political
party identifications, which shows that Democrats tend support President Obama’s push for the
closure of the prison, more than any other party, with over half of the Democrats supporting the
closure in May 2009 and then a slight drop to fifty percent in November 2009. (Newport 2009).

Views on Closing Guantanamo Prison and Moving Some Prisoners to
the United States, by Party ID
%

Should close prison, move some prisoners to U.S.
May 29-31, 2009

33%

Nov 20-22, 2009

50%
29%

28%
9%

Democrats

Independents

8%

Republicans

GALLUP

15

Figure 2: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup on the number of those polled, by
political party, who support the closure of the prison and moving the detainees to the
United States.
Another poll conducted by Pew Research Center shows the same results, in November
2009, more people wanted to keep Guantanamo Bay open, forty-nine percent of people
disapproved closing Guantanamo while thirty-nine percent pushed for the closure of the prison.
However, in 2012 this situation would reverse. Seventy percent of people wanted to keep
Guantanamo Bay open while only twenty four percent still pushed for the closure of the prison.
(Tyson 2013).

Views of Guantanamo:
2012 and 2009
F e b ru a ry . 2 0 1 2

Total

Rep

Dem

%

%

%

%

A p p ro v e

70

79

61

73

D isa p p ro v e

24

15

32

23

D o n 't k n o w

6

6

7

4

100

100

100

100

39

18

59

37

D isa p p ro v e

49

75

26

53

D o n 't k n o w

12

7

15

11

100

100

100

100

Decision to keep
Guantanamo OPEN*

Ind

N o v e m b e r. 2009
D e c is io n to C L O S E
G u a n ta n a m o
A p p ro v e

PEW RESEARCH CENTER.
* February, 2012 data from ABC News/Washington Post
survey.

Figure 3: Public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center that shows the
comparison of results from 2009 and 2012 on the people polled’s support or disapproval
of keeping Guantanamo Bay open.

International Pressure
When it comes to looking at international pressure on the United States’ decision to
“close” Guantanamo Bay, it is important to take Cuba into consideration. Considering the United
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States of America and Cuba entered a legally binding agreement in 1903 where the United States
gained control over the Guantanamo Bay area, situated on the Cuban island. However, in recent
years as the United States and Cuba have been attempting to re-establish the relationship
between the two countries there have been mixed feelings about the U.S.’ presence at
Guantanamo Bay. The Cuban government has asked, rather demanded, that the United States’
government gives the Guantanamo Bay military base back to Cuba before there can be any
restoration of relations between the countries (BBC 2015).
Raul Castro has stated that Cuba will begin to commence the restoration of the their
relationship with the United States, under two conditions: the United States giving Guantanamo
Bay back to Cuba and the end of the United States’ trade embargos placed on Cuba (BBC 2015).
Castro claims that the Guantanamo Bay naval base was illegally occupied by the United States
(BBC 2015) and the people of Cuba also believe that the land was stolen from the Cubans
(Navarro 2005). However, the land cannot be given back to Cuba unless there is a mutual
agreement between Cuba and the U.S. (Navarro 2005) and yet the Obama administration was not
ready to change the lease that would give the naval base back to Cuba (Lamothe and GibbonsNeff 2016). While the Obama administration has been aiming to close down the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay, the administration does not want to give up the whole naval base
because they believe that the naval bas has a larger mission that goes beyond the detention
facility (Lamothe and Gibbons-Neff 2016). However, the Obama administration is working to
improve relations with Cuba through increasing trade via the abolition of the U.S.’ trade
embargos on Cuba and also by removing the travel ban that was previously in place, allowing
United States citizen to travel to Cuba.
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Apart from Cuba there have been numerous nations and international actors that have
advocated for the closure of Guantanamo Bay including: Chancellor Angela Merkel, Spanish
Judge Baltasar Garzón, Church of England Synod, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland
Dermot Ahrem, South African Archbishop Desmon Tutu, Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia
Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, and the Icelandic Parliament (CSHRA 2005). There has also been
steep pressure from the European Union, the United Nations, and Amnesty International.
The European Union has pushed for the closure of the Guantanamo Bay facility and the
institution has also come up with a plan and ideas to aid the United States in the closing
procedures. In 2006, the European Parliament drafted and finalized a resolution on Guantanamo
Bay. Within the resolution it says that, like most other international actors, that the European
Parliament was and still is against the use of Guantanamo Bay because there, the United States
was violating human rights (EPRG 2006). The European Parliament argued that the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay deserved the right to a fair trial, this came after the fact that the United States
government signed a statement stating that the detainees being held at Guantanamo bay have no
right to a fair trial in the United States’ civil courts (EPRG 2006). The European Parliament also
believed that the United States Army Regulation 190-55 was unlawful because this allowed
prisoners who were given the death penalty by courts-martial to be executed at not only
Guantanamo Bay but also all detention centers (EPRG 2006).
At the end of the European Parliament’s resolution, the European Parliament calls out the
United States and wants the U.S. government to take action and close Guantanamo Bay. The
resolution states:
[European Parliament] Calls on the US Administration to close the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility and insists that every prisoner should be treated in accordance with
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international humanitarian law and tried without delay in a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent, impartial tribunal… Condemns all forms of torture and illtreatment and reiterates the need to comply with international law… Reiterates that the
fight against terrorism…can only be successfully pursued if human rights and civil
liberties are fully respected. (EPRG 2006).
Since that resolution was passed, the European Union and the United States government have
been meeting and working with one another to find solutions and ways to close Guantanamo Bay
and in hopes of future counter-terrorism cooperation. However, in particular the European Union
is worried about the U.S.’ disregard for human rights in the detention facility. In a “Factsheet”
posted on the European Union Delegation to the United Nations website it says, “By working
with the US in its endeavors to close Guantanamo, the EU hopes it can make a positive
contribution to changing US policies… in particular, indefinite detention without trial needs to
be addressed to avoid creating unlawful detention facilities elsewhere” (Accessed 2017).
However, it has not only been state actors that have been opposed to Guantanamo Bay
but also international organizations such as the United Nations and Amnesty International. These
two organizations have been opposed to the operation of Guantanamo Bay for the same reasons
as the European Union, the belief that the facility is a violation of human rights. Navanethem
Pillay, the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the United Nations spoke out about the
United States inability to close the Guantanamo detention facility and the failure of being held
accountable for human rights violations such as the use of torture that took place at the facility
and international law violations (UN News Centre 2012). Ms. Pillay also condemned the
National Defense Authorization Act, which normalized and allowed indefinite military detention
without the detainee being charged or allowed a trial (UN News Centre 2012). She also called
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for those employees that “perpetrated, ordered, tolerated, or condoned torture and ill-treatment”
be brought to justice and that as long as the detention facility remains open, then the facility must
fully comply with the human rights standards put in place under international law (UN News
Centre 2012).
Amnesty International has also argued amongst the same points via numerous campaign
articles posted to their website. The organization argues that the continued operation of the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility is an example of the United States’ double standard on
human rights (Amnesty International). Amnesty International’s Security and Human Rights
Campaign has four main goals that are driving their agenda and activism: first, to advise the
United States government to close the detention facility immediately (Amnesty International).
Second, demand the United States government to release or give fair trial to all of the detainees
being held in the detention facility (Amnesty International). Third, stop Congress from passing
legislation that prohibits the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay (Amnesty
International). Fourth, demand that the United States be held accountable for treating detainees
cruelly, inhumanely, and with degrading treatment (Amnesty International). The organization
also wants to make sure that the Obama Administration and the United States government
understands that the human rights cannot be sacrificed for national security (Amnesty
International).
Amnesty International and numerous other organizations sponsored protests, in
Washington D.C., against the Obama Administration failure to maintain and uphold his
campaign promise of closing down the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. January 11th, 2013,
eleven years after the first prisoners were brought into the Guantanamo Bay detention facility
Amnesty International and numerous organizations sponsored worldwide protests in order to
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show their opposition to the prison (Amnesty International 2013). Fifty-five protestors dressed
up in orange jumpsuits with black bags over their heads to represent the fifty-five detainees that
have been cleared to be transferred by the United States government but had not be transferred
(Amnesty International 2013). Other protestors carried signs and marched from the White House
down to the Supreme Court to make their voices heard but this not only took place in D.C. but in
cities around the globe to put pressure on the United States government (Amnesty International
2013).

Intervention in Libya
As a result of the Arab Spring, anti-government protests that began in February 2011 in
Libya, former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi ordered his security forces to crack down on
protesters that took action in Benghazi. As the protests began to spread throughout Libya, the
country was on the brink of a civil war that would soon follow. Numerous civilian deaths
occurred and many political officials in the Libyan government resigned from office and
demanded for the removal of “the tyrant Muammar Qaddafi”. (CNN Library 2016b).
The first move the United States took was the evacuation of Americans in Libya and
closed the U.S. Embassy in Libya in late February 2011. Next, President Obama signed an
executive order that froze Qaddafi’s assets. Following President Obama, the United Nations
Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya, which included an arms embargo and
freezing Libyan assets. The European Union also began to impose sanctions against Libya,
which included the same stipulations as the U.N. Security Council’s sanctions. In March, NATO
began 24-hour air surveillance of Libya and the U.N. Security Council and NATO establish a no-
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fly zone over Libya. In April, NATO began using airstrikes to target Libyan rebels. (CNN
Library 2016b).
The Libya Contact Group, which included, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy,
Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan agreed to set up a fund that would provide money and support the
Libyan opposition. The National Transitional Council (NTC) took over power in Libya and
many countries around the world recognized the NTC as the legitimate authority in Libya
including the United States. On October 20, 2011 Muammar Qaddafi was killed after rebel
forces in Sirte, Libya capture him. A few days later, the NTC declared the nation’s freedom in
Benghazi and the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to end their military operations in
Libya, which in turn cancelled the NATO mission in Libya at the end of the month. Following
the end of the missions, the NTC elected Abdurrahim El-Keib as their prime minister. (CNN
Library 2016b).
Regarding the United States freezing the assets of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime, which
was over thirty-three billion U.S. dollars (Obama 2011 c), there were off-the-record meetings of
the Council on Foreign Relations where lawyers and former political appointees from the Bush
administration had discussed what to do with this money (Carter 2011). In one of former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s released emails, Barry Carter explained that at the meeting
these officials talked about how frozen Libyan assets should be used to help fund the United
States’ military costs of it role in Libya and that some of the funds should be used to aid in the
reduction of the U.S. deficit (2011). However, at the end of the email, Carter adds in his own
personal statement saying that these proposed ideas would be inconsistent to what President
Obama had stated, that the money did not belong to the U.S. or Qaddafi but rather to the Libyan
people, and also inconsistent with the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. He
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adds in that it would also make the U.S.’ allies and the Libyan people question the U.S.’
intentions, and that the worst charge would be that the United States would be using Muslim
money to fund a war against the Muslims. (Carter 2011).
President Obama stated that after talking to his national security team and Congress
(Obama 2011a), they came to the decision that intervening in Libya was in the best interest of the
United States in terms of national security and foreign policy (Obama 2011 b). In a speech by
President Obama at the National Defense University he stated that the United States has played
the role as an anchor of global security and an advocate for human freedom and that when the
U.S.’ values are at stake, there is a responsibility to act (2011c). The president claimed that this
was the reason for getting involved in Libya by stating that Muammar Qaddafi had ignored and
taken away his peoples’ freedom, exploited their wealth, had murdered opponents to his regime
both at home and abroad, and had terrorized innocent people around the world- which include
Americans who were killed by Libyan agents. Therefore, President Obama had explained that
the United States’ intervention was for humanitarian reasons by saying that the United States got
involved in order to protect the citizens of Libya from the “tyrant Muammar Qaddafi” (2011 c).
In the same speech, President Obama also addressed people who were opposed to the
United States getting involved in Libya. The president said that those in opposition to his
decision made the argument that there were numerous places in the world were innocent civilians
faced brutal government violence and that America should not be expected to “police the
world”(2011 c) when there were so many issues that need to be worked on in the States. The
president addressed this opposition by saying that Libya was foreshadowing violence on a
horrific scale and that the United States had a “unique ability” (2011 c) to stop that violence
through an international mandate for action, a global coalition that had joined the U.S., the
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Support of the Arab countries, and there was a cry for help from the Libyan citizens themselves.
The president also stated that there was an ability to stop Qaddafi forces without having to risk
American troops lives by putting boots on the ground. (2011 c).
President Obama also made two other points in favor of his decision to get involved in
Libya. First, he claimed that there was a strategic interest in getting involved because if the
United States had not gotten involved there would have been a continuation of massacres which,
would have driven out thousands of additional refugees across Libya’s borders into Egypt and
Tunisia which were in the process of peaceful, yet fragile democratic transitions (2011c). This
influx of refugees would have disrupted and placed major strains on the political transitions in
Egypt and Tunisia that came as a result of the Arab Spring. The next argument President Obama
made in his speech was that if there was not an intervention in Libya, the writ of the U.N.
Security Council would have been nothing but empty words and sheets of paper, which in turn
would have harmed the credibility of the U.N. to uphold global security and peace (2011c).
There are some people who do not believe that the United States’ intervention in Libya
was about humanitarian reasons or the protection of Libyan citizens at all but rather that it was
about the U.S. wanting a regime change in Libya from the start. Micah Zenko, a writer for
Foreign Policy, wrote about the hypocrisy in the Obama administration when it came to what the
administration said to the public vs. what the administration actually authorized. Zenko
mentioned that the Obama administration misled the American public because had the
administration stated that they were after a regime change all along, there would have been even
less support from the public. The first action Zenko pointed out was that the Obama
administration continuously claimed that they were not out to kill or take out Muammar Qaddafi,
yet just hours into the intervention on October 20, 2011, missiles launched from a British
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submarine that struck one of Qaddafi’s administration buildings in his compound which was less
than fifty yards from his residence. (2016).
The next point that Zenko mentioned was the hypocrisy in the arms embargo. Resolution
1970 was supposed to prohibit the transfer of arms from either side of the opponents in Libya
during the war. NATO officials consistently claimed that there had been no violation of the arms
embargo. However, Egypt and Qatar were shipping weapons to rebel groups the entire time and
the two countries even had the blessing of the Obama administration. There is a piece of
evidence that came from a video that NATO released on May 24, 2011. In the video a Canadian
frigate, that was supposed to be enforcing the arms embargo, boarded a rebel boat and found
small arms and explosives which were both prohibited by Resolution 1970. Libyan rebels were
using the boat to move arms from Benghazi to Misratah and when the NATO officials that
boarded the boat called NATO headquarters to figure out what to do, NATO decided to let the
rebels continue on their path with no consequences at all. (2016).
According to public opinion polls conducted by Gallup approximately three months from
one another showed that there was a decline in the American citizens’ support for U.S. military
operations in Libya. (Jones 2011).
N e x t w e have a question about the m u re n t m ilitary action b y the
United S ta te s and o th er countries against Libya. Do yo u approve
o r disapprove o f th e cu rren t U.S. m ilita n / actions against Libya?
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Figure 4: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup about United States military actions in
Libya in 2011.
In a different public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center they showed that the
majority of the American public did not believe that the United States had a responsibility to
intervene in Libya. (Jones 2011).

Small Partisan Differences in
V iew s of U.S R esp o n sib ility in
Libya
U.S, has responsibility to
d o som ething about
fighting in Libya ?

DK

Does

Does not

%

%

%

T o ta l

27

63

10= 100

M en

30

63

7=100

W om en

24

62

14= 100

1 8 -2 9

31

55

14= 100

3 0 -4 9

31

62

7= 100

5 0 -6 4

27

66

6= 100

65+

18

69

13= 100

C o lle g e g r a d +

28

63

10= 100

S o m e c o lle g e

31

57

12= 100

H S o r le s s

25

67

9= 100

R e p u b lic a n

27

65

8= 100

D e m o c ra t

33

57

10= 100

In d e p e n d e n t

24

67

9= 100

F o llo w in g n e w s f r o m
L ib y a ...
V e r y c lo s e ly

36

58

5 = 100

L e s s c lo s e ly

23

65

12= 100

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Mar. 10-13 2011. PEW5. Figures
may not add to 100% because of rounding.

Figure 5: Public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center about if the United
States has a responsibility to act in Libya. Results are broken down by demographics of
those polled.
Also conducted by the Pew Research Center a second poll showed that the majority of
Americans were against using military forces in Libya because they believed that the United
States’ military forces were already overcommitted. (Pew Research Center 2011).
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Figure 6: Public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center that shows why
citizens were against getting involved in Libya.

International Pressure
Internationally, the intervention in Libya was very controversial, many nations across the
globe were hesitant to get involved and support countries such as France and Great Britain. The
United States was one of those hesitant countries, it did not want to be heavily involved in
military intervention but once a no-fly zone was established in Libya, the United States came to
the aid of fellow NATO, UN Security Council and European countries. There was an increasing
amount of pressure on the United States to get involved from the French and the British
governments, who spearheaded the movement for military involvement against Muammar
Qaddafi’s oppressive regime.
Former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s foreign minister, Alain Juppe, and
former Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, placed a lot of pressure on the United
Nations Security Council, which the United States is a part of, to put into place a no-fly zone
over Libya and to potentially consider the use of airstrikes on Qaddafi’s regime (Cody 2011).
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Former French foreign minister Juppe laid out multiple conditions for establishing a no-fly zone
over Libya such as: “it would need the international legitimacy of a clear United Nations
Security Council resolution; it should not be a NATO operation because of the Alliance’s image
in the Arab world as an American tool; it would need at least symbolic Arab military
participation; and it would require an explicit call from the Arab world” (The Economist 2011).
Nicolas Sarkozy believed that if Qaddafi’s regime was harming his citizens by using chemical
weapons or air strikes against them, then the use of force and outside intervention was needed in
order to aid and protect the Libyan citizens (Watt 2011). Sarkozy and Cameron said that if
Qaddafi’s regime were guilty of crimes against humanity then that would grant the necessary
legality under the Geneva conventions to establish a no-fly zone or targeted air strikes (Watt
2011).
Numerous European countries were against the idea of establishing a no-fly zone over
Libya because they believed that it would cause more collateral damage and civilian deaths
rather than doing any good and that establishing and setting up a no-fly zone would have taken
too long as in weeks or months (Watt 2011). At the time, the United States government,
especially former US defense secretary Robert Gates, were confused as to how a no-fly zone
would actually be effective as most of the slaughtering was happening on the ground and the
U.S. then demanded for more (Wintour and Watt 2011). Many diplomatic leaders thought
Sarkozy was crazy and irresponsible for having recognized the transitional government as the
legitimate representative of the Libyan people (Watt 2011). However, David Cameron thought
that the no-fly zone and increased measures on Libya were necessary in order to send a clear
message to Qaddafi’s regime and tell him that their behavior is unacceptable and that he must
step down from power (Watt 2011). Cameron also stated that this should have been an
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opportunity for Europe and other democratic nations to be encouraging and shaping the
democratic shifts in North Africa caused by the Arab Spring (Watt 2011).
France, Great Britain, and the United States had all demanded that Qaddafi step down
from power however, France took the lead in the movement and France was also the first country
to recognize the rebel leadership, or the Libyan Transnational National Council, as the legitimate
representative of Libya and the Libyan people (Cody 2011). Former President of the United
States Barack Obama believed that the United States should not have been involved in an Arab
civil war and that he would rely on other allies to the U.S. to make the no-fly zone happen (Cody
2011). Alain Juppe once stated that he was unhappy with the slowness of the United States
government and their difficulty in deciding and defining their stance on the issue before the
United Nations had agreed on the no-fly zone (Erlanger 2011). Juppe stated to the French
Parliament: “Never mind that there’s European impotence, but what about American power? ‥‥
The Americans haven’t yet defined their position” (Erlanger 2011). Alain Juppe’s statement
shows that there was increasing pressure on the United States government from not only France
but from those European countries that became involved in the intervention in Libya. It is also
important to note that both Great Britain and France are a part of NATO and the United Nations
Security Council alongside the United States, making the countries allies; there is a possibility
that there was a lot of influence and pressure from Britain and France in those meetings.
When the war was coming to an end former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and
former Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, visited Tripoli, Libya and were greeted
as heroes by the Libyan people (Spencer 2011). During this visit both world leaders explained
that there was a new resolution that was being drafted by the United Nations in hopes of lifting
the arms embargo on Libya, to establish a United Nations mission in Tripoli, to gradually
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unfreeze the remaining assets being held in the United States to Libya, and to lift the no-fly zone
(Spencer 2011). Once NATO took control of the operation, sources say that the victory would
not have been possible without the aid of the United States because they have “the intelligence
assets in the sky and air-to-air refueling that is invaluable for a long-haul mission. Without the
US, the whole damn thing would not have happened” (Wintour and Watt 2011).
The support from the Arab League and mainly, Amr Moussa, the Egyptian secretary
general of the Arab League meant that Lebanon supported the resolution and Lebanon is the only
Arab country that is a member of the United Nations Security Council (Wintour and Watt 2011).
After this support, this resolution went from being about establishing a no-fly zone to “all
necessary measures” (Wintour and Watt 2011). However, the Arab League stressed that there
was to be no “foreign military” intervention in Libya and that the no-fly zone must be lifted as
soon as the crisis was taken care of (Al Jazeera 2011). This approval by the Arab League placed
a lot of pressure on not only the United States but also Europe because numerous states had
stated that a no-fly zone could not be implemented without the support of the Arab Nations
(Leiby and Mansour 2011). In response to the Arab League’s immediate demand for a no-fly
zone, a representative from the White House stated, “we welcome this important step by the
Arab League, which strengthens the international pressure on Qaddafi and support for the Libyan
people…The United States will continue to advance our efforts to pressure Qaddafi, to support
the Libyan opposition, and to prepare for all contingencies, in close coordination with our
international partners” (Leiby and Mansour 2011). Officials of the Libyan Transnational
National Council at the time welcomed the establishment of the no-fly zone which placed
pressure on the United States, Europe, and the U.N. Security Council to pass the resolution and
begin the process of establishment (Leiby and Mansour 2011).
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Drone Program
The drone program began in 2004 under President George W. Bush’s administration. By
the time President Bush left office in 2009 he had launched forty-nine drone strikes, forty-eight
of which were in Pakistan and one in Yemen. These air strikes killed approximately 356
militants in the Middle East that were viewed as enemies of the United States in the war on
terror. Since President Obama was inaugurated in 2009, his administration has expanded former
President Bush’s covert drone program immensely and has essentially replaced the “boots on the
ground” approach to fighting terrorism with the drone program. (Boyer 2013).
As of mid-April 2013, President Obama had launched approximately 379 drone strikes,
which is close to eight times the amount of drone strikes launched during the Bush
administration. Seventy-two of the drone strikes had taken place in Yemen and almost three
thousand militants had been killed, about one thousand of which were killed in Yemen.
However, under President Obama there have been numerous concerns regarding the amount of
civilian deaths. The New America Foundation, a non profit think tank in Washington D.C.,
reported that an estimated number of 368 civilians had been killed during the United States’
drone campaign and up to 233 deaths have occurred so far during President Obama’s
administration. (Boyer 2013).
President Obama’s administration has claimed that between 2009 and the end of 2015
that they had only launched 473 strikes, which killed between 2,372 and 2,581 terrorists. The
administration also claimed that only between 64 and 116 civilians have died during the attacks.
These numbers released by the administration, which claimed to be transparent throughout the
attacks, have been under scrutiny from the media, bureaus, and senators. Spencer Ackerman
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from The Guardian says that the civilian number only represents one country and leaves out
three other countries that had been targeted by the United States ‘ drone strikes. Also, the
administration did not give specifics as to where the strikes had occurred. The Bureau of
Investigative Journalism reported that the civilian death toll during the Obama administration has
been more than 800 people. However, in 2013 Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina had
said that the drone strikes had killed more than 4,700 people. (Ackerman 2016). This lack of
consistency in the numbers shows just how secretive the Obama administration has been with the
drone program regardless of how “transparent” the administration said that they would be with
the public.
In a speech given by President Barack Obama at the National Defense University in
Washington D.C. he talked about drones saying that the actions taken by the United States’
government were effective in the fight on terror. He gave the example of the intelligence that
was gathered from Osama bin Laden’s compound, where American forces found that bin Laden
had written “We could lose the reserves to enemy’s air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with
explosives” (2013). Different forms of communication from al-Qaeda officials had confirmed
what bin Laden said as well. The president then stated that dozens of high ranking and skilled alQaeda officials had been taken off the battlefields due to air strikes and that numerous plots had
been disrupted that targeted international flights, transit systems in the United States, numerous
European cities, and American troops in Afghanistan. President Obama ended the introduction
on the drone program by stating that these strikes had saved lives. President Obama continued to
say that America having a legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the United States’ only
reason to initiate drone strikes. (2013).
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The Obama administration created the “U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the
Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active
Hostilities” to have a set guideline and procedure for how and when the United States could
initiate the use of force, especially drone warfare. In the document it is stated that since President
Obama took office in 2009 he has made it clear that the United States will use all available tools
to protect the citizens of America from al-Qaeda and its associated forces’ terrorist threats. It has
claimed that the most important consideration in the use of lethal force is whether or not the
actions will protect American lives. The document stated that the United States will not use
lethal force when it is feasible to capture a terrorist suspect, capturing a suspects gives the
government the opportunity to gather intelligence and disrupt terrorist plots. (2013)
The document also laid out four specific guidelines where the use of lethal force is
tolerable: first, when there is a legal basis for the use of lethal force. Second, the United States
would only use lethal force against a target that is a continuous and imminent threat to United
States citizens. Third, the following criteria must be met:
near certainty that the terrorist target is present; near certainty that non-combatants will
not be injured or killed; an assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the
operation; an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where
action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons;
and an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the
threat to U.S. persons (USPSPUPCOOUS 2013).
Finally, when the United States uses force in foreign land, international law, respect for
sovereignty and law of armed conflict, inflict constraints on the United States use of force and its
ability to act unilaterally. (USPSPUPCOOUS 2013).
The administration also laid out in the document who is responsible to make the decisions
to either capture the target or use force against the terrorist. Those decisions would be made at
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the most senior levels of the United States government who will be informed by relevant
departments and agencies. Senior national security officials will make sure that these policy
standards are being met while lawyers will determine the legality of these standards.
(USPSPUPCOOUS 2013). After decisions have been made, the administration briefs the
relevant committees of Congress and going back to President Obama’s speech he likes to point
out that Congress is briefed on every strike that the government orders and that Congress
authorized the use of force in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Obama 2013).
Michael Hayden, a former Air Force Four Star General and Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency from 2006 to 2009, in an article for The New York Times said that the drone
program worked and that it has been the most precise and effective use of firepower in the
history of war and armed conflict. Not only has it disrupted terrorist plots but it has also reduced
the al-Qaeda group along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to a “shell of its former self”(2016).
Hayden said that drone strikes have killed high-value targets that were suspected to be at the
destination of the strike but it was not certain that they were there. There have been no excuses
made about killing lower-level terrorists because the government of the United States saw these
actions as “legitimate acts of war against an armed enemy” and during a time of war, it is
necessary to kill foot soldiers as well. Hayden states that with evidence the government gained
from Osama bin Laden’s compound after he was killed, there were reports showing that the
United States’ air strikes were devastating to al-Qaeda and in the end even frightened al-Qaeda
because now they had to worry about their survival. At the end of his article Hayden states that
even though civilians have died at the hands of these drone strikes, the death toll from terrorist
attacks would have been much higher and devastating had the United States not taken action.
(2016).
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James Downie from The Washington Post believes quite the opposite of President Obama
and Michael Hayden. Downie believed that President Obama’s drone war will be a shameful part
of the legacy he leaves as president. First, he argued that drones might not be an effective tool in
the war on terrorism and that the embrace of drones had led to a preference for killing terrorist
rather than capturing them for intelligence. He also said that dropping a bomb from a drone
would lead to more radicalized terrorist because the strikes would be used as propaganda for the
terrorist organizations. Next, Downie stated that according to leaked documents, from the
Intercept website and a book written by staff members of the website titled “The Assassination
Complex”, show how easy it is for an innocent civilian, who could or could not be American, to
be added to the United States’ government’s terrorist database. (2016).
Downie also stated that according to these documents the government had severely
overstated how much they follow the guidelines to authorize a strike. In 2013 Obama said that
the United States would only conduct drone strikes against terrorist groups who were a
continuous and imminent threat to American citizens and if there was a near certainty that no
civilians would die in the process. These documents have shown that once the president has
approved a strike, the Pentagon and the CIA have sixty days to act; Downie argued that sixty
days would no longer be considered an imminent threat. Downie believed President Obama
chose to expand the drone war under the beliefs that it was legal, moral, and good policy.
However, Downie argued that that is a mistaken belief and that the drone war is an unfading and
shameful legacy of his presidency. (2016).
At the end of President Obama’s first term, according to a public opinion poll by Gallup,
approximately two-thirds or sixty-five percent of Americans agreed with the use of drone strikes
against suspected terrorists. These polls also show that the people who tend to follow the news
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about the drone campaign are more willing to support the use of drones. (Brown and Newport
2013).
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Figure 7: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup that shows what the people polled
believe drones should or should not be used for.
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Figure 8: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup that shows how closely American
citizens follow the news on the use of drones.
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Figure 9: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup that shows the results from figures 7
and 8 combined.
In a more recent public opinion poll conducted by The Pew Research Center on the
use of drones they show that public opinion on the use of drones is still high however,
many civilians are worried that the use of drones are endangering the lives of innocent
civilians. (Pew Research Center 2015).
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Figure 10: Public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center that shows
percentages of the public that approve, disapprove, or do not have an opinion on the use
of drones against extremists.

International Pressure
The drone program is an interesting case as in it is challenging to find information
relating to the use of the drones themselves and the details about airstrikes that have occurred
under President Obama’s administration. It has been even more difficult to find enough
information to talk about cases of airstrikes and drone usage throughout President Obama’s first
term therefore, for this case there will be an examination of the use of drones and airstrikes in the
Syrian Civil War and to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant which had taken place
throughout Obama’s second presidential term. This case is interesting also because it is not
necessarily the United States being pressured by other countries to get involved because the
airstrike operations are led by the United States but rather the United States pressuring other
countries into supporting the mission in some way, shape, or form; whether it is through flying
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drones and conducting airstrikes, gathering and sharing intelligence, providing planes to refill the
gas of those that are conducting the airstrikes, and etc. There have been numerous countries who
have support the United States’ use of drones and airstrikes in both Syria and Iraq including:
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Belgium, Denmark, Canada,
Germany, Australia, Egypt, Israel, Britain, France, Georgia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland (The
Associated Press 2014).
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the Gulf countries have
become some of the U.S. largest counterterrorism partners (Schulberg 2014). The Gulf States:
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, are some of the biggest supporters
of the drone program and the airstrike campaign because of their close relationship with the
United States. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates all heavily rely on the
United States for military support (Schulberg 2014). One of the main reasons for the
involvement of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the U.A.E is that they have been dominated by the
Sunni sector of Islam and there is this underlying fear of the Shiite regional dominance which is
mainly led by Iran (Schulberg 2014). These powerful Sunni’s in said countries have been
allocating funds to extremist militant groups who have gone against Iranian and Shiite interests,
therefore meaning that these countries have been supporting the Syrian oppositions group who
have been fighting to push President Assad out of power in Syria (Schulberg 2014). Qatar and
the U.A.E. both have airbases that are being used by the United States and other countries in
order to conduct the airstrikes in Syria against the Islamic State (The Associated Press 2014).
The U.A.E has also been allocating money and funds to the Syrian opposition groups so that they
have the ability to obtain weapons and can afford to pay their soldiers for fighting (Schulberg
2014). Bahrain is useful to the United States because the U.S. has been able to send their Navy
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ships that have been involved in the airstrikes to naval bases in Bahrain (The Associated Press
2014) however, they have managed to stay out of direct intervention in Syria or Iraq (Schulberg
2014). The Saudi Arabian government offered to host United States training facilities within
their country that was responsible for training thousands of Syrian rebels and opposition group
members; also, the Saudi government had been allocating weapons to these opposition groups as
well (Schulberg 2014).
All of the gulf countries except Qatar have participated in the airstrikes in Syria, the
Pentagon has stated that Qatar has played more of a “supporting” role (The Associated Press
2014). The Qatari government has not previously explained the reasons behind their limited
involvement but however, they do have the smallest military force in the Middle East which
prompts the government to use more soft powers and diplomatic stances (Schulberg 2014). Qatar
has a strong alliance with the United States due to its buildup of wealth from natural gas and
because of its strategic location in the Middle East; the United States now has its Central
Command (CENTCOM) stationed in a Qatari airbase (Schulberg 2014). Qatar also agreed and
did pay for the construction of this airbase and they let the United States store and station their
military equipment at the base (Schulberg 2014). Qatar’s relationship with other Middle Eastern
countries is rocky. Qatar had been accused of providing funds to terrorist organizations,
including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, therefore, remaining in comfortable relations
with the United States would help reduce that tension and ease the minds of other Arab countries
(Schulberg 2014).
Britain has also been involved in providing support to the United States by participating
in the airstrike campaigns in Iraq and Syria. Between the years 2015 and 2016 Britain had
expanded their involvement in the campaign by providing more aircrafts and by agreeing to
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participate in airstrikes not only in Iraq but also in Syria (Cole 2016). It is obvious that Britain is
very involved in the campaign because from the beginning of the US-led campaign in 2014- June
2016, Britain had launched approximately 944 airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria (Cole 2016).
There is this constraint on British political action by the United States because the U.S. does not
want any enemy of the Syrian opposition, ISIL, President Assad, or the al-Nusra Front to win the
Syrian Civil War decisively; the U.S. government believes that a “moderate Syrian constituency”
opposed to those three groups could at some point potentially take over the Syrian capital and
government (Cockburn 2015). Not only did former Prime Minister of Britain David Cameron
believe this idea as well but also that this moderate opposition group has approximately 70,000
fighters involved, many other people believe that this is nothing but a fantasy and that it is close
to impossible placing Syria in a never ending war (Cockburn 2015).

Analysis:
When analyzing the three foreign policies discussed in this paper that were implemented
by President Barack Obama throughout his first term it is clear that two out of three of the cases
do not show any influence of public opinion being taken into consideration. The closing of
Guantanamo Bay and the United States’ intervention in Libya clearly go against the popular
demand of the public, while the expansion of the drone program tends to have more freedom in
allowing one to say that this policy could have been adopted based on the public’s supportive
opinion of the program.
First, take into consideration President Obama’s attempt to close Guantanamo Bay
prison. For the president this policy idea was more of a campaign promise, he promised to close
the prison within the first year of taking office but that never happened, eight years have passed
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and the facility is still open. Why is that? That is because President Obama has faced stiff
opposition not only from the public but also from Congress. Congress has passed laws and
regulations that prohibit the president from moving detainees from Guantanamo Bay to prisons
in the United States, which has severely hindered the president’s process in closing the prison.
Aside from the heavy and certainly increasing opposition from Congress he has faced heavy
opposition from the American public.
Going back to the public opinion polls conducted by both Gallup and the Pew Research
Center in the closing Guantanamo Bay section, it is easy to see that President Obama is acting
against popular public opinion. In Figure 1: Gallup asks the public if they believe that the United
States should or should not close the Guantanamo Bay prison and move some of the prisoners to
the United States’ prisons? This question was asked in both May and November of 2009 and the
results stayed consistent. A majority of those polled, 65% in May and 64% in November said
that the prison should not be closed nor should prisoners be moved to the United States. While in
May 32% and in November 30% believed that the prison should close and prisoners transported
to the U.S. There were also 3% in May and 5% in November who had no opinion on the issue at
hand.
In Figure 2: the poll is a break down of the previous numbers into United States party
identifications. Not surprising, over 50% of Democrats agreed with President Obama’s decision
to close the prison and move some prisoners to U.S. prisons. However, approximately 30% of
Independents and less than 10% of Republicans agreed with President Obama’s decision to close
the Guantanamo Bay prison and move prisoners to the United States.
In Figure 3: there are two different years in which the public was polled first in
November 2009 and the second in February 2012. In November 2009, the public was asked if
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they agreed or disagreed with the decision to close Guantanamo Bay. In total, only 39% of those
polled agreed with this decision, 18% of Republicans, 59% of Democrats, and 37% of
Independents wanted to see the prison close while 49% total wanted to see the prison remain
open: 75% of Republicans, 26% of Democrats, and 53% of Independents. One important aspect
of the table to notice is the flip in Democrat numbers from 2009-2012. Where a majority of
Democrats wanted the prison to close in 2009, according to the table a majority of the Democrats
in 2012 wanted the prison to remain open. In February 2012 the population polled were asked if
they agreed or disagreed with the decision to keep Guantanamo Bay open. In total, 70% agreed
to keep the camp open, breaking that down into: 79% of Republicans, 61% of Democrats, and
73% of Independents. While a total of 24% wanted to close the camp: 15% of Republicans, 32%
of Democrats, and 23% of Independents.
The number of Democrats, who mainly supported Democratic President Obama’s desire
to close the prison, in the beginning the numbers were strong in supporting such decision.
However, as time progressed into President Obama’s second term their belief in the prison
actually closing declined and the Democrats began to support leaving the prison open. While
throughout President Obama’s two terms in office he has continuously pushed his campaign
promise and fought to close Guantanamo Bay with little success, this shows that public opinion
did not influence his decision. Despite public opinion being strongly against President Obama’s
decision to close the prison, he continuously pushed for the closure of Guantanamo Bay. These
polls show that a majority of American citizens wanted the prison to remain open, with numbers
such as: 49%, 64%, 65%, and 70% of the population polled wanting the Guantanamo Bay prison
to remain open. Regardless of these numbers, President Obama, in 2016, is still striving and
pushing for the closure of the facility.
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The theme stays the same when it comes to the United States government’s decision to
intervene in Libya in 2011. Figure 4 shows that in both March and June of 2011 Gallup polled
citizens and asked them if they approved or disapproved of the United States military actions in
Libya. In March 2011, Gallup reported that 47 percent of the public approved of the military
action in Libya while 37 percent disapproved, and 16 percent had no opinion on the topic.
However, in June 2011 when the public was asked the same question, this time only 39 percent
approved of the military action in Libya while 46 percent disapproved, and 15 percent had no
opinion on the topic.
Figures 5 and 6 show that the public was wary and opposed to military intervention in
Libya. In Figure 5: the public was asked if they believed that the United States had a
responsibility to take action in Libya and 63 percent of those asked said no, while 27 percent said
yes, and 10 percent had no opinion. Figure 6 shows that the public, 51 percent, was mainly
against the use of force in Libya because they believed that the United States’ military was
already too overcommitted. Along with 19 percent believing that opposition groups could turn
out to be no better than the current government in Libya; 13 percent believing that Libya was not
of vital interest to the United States; 5 percent just did not support force; and 12 percent did not
have an opinion.
While there may have been general public support for the United States’ intervention in
Libya during the beginning of the campaign, it is safe to say that the public’s opinion did not
play a crucial role in President Obama’s decision making on the issue. Soon after the United
States became involved in Libya in March 2011, it seems as if public opinion took a turn and
became less supportive of the operation. While President Obama preached that the United States
has a role and a duty to act as an enforcer of global security and an activist for global peace, the
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American citizens believed differently in these circumstances. According to the polls, not only
did a majority of the public believe that the United States did not have a responsibility to get
involved or do something about the fighting in Libya, but also they believed that the United
States’ military was already overextended and overcommitted in other places around the globe.
This shows that President Obama did go against public opinion because he continued to act in
Libya against the general wishes of the American public.
When it comes to the implementation of the drone program by the Obama administration
the results become blurred and unclear because while the public opinion polls show a majority of
the American public’s support for the program, there is also speculation that by President Obama
using drones in his counterterrorism policy that this could just be a continuation from the George
W. Bush administration. However, while the Obama administration has claimed that they would
be as transparent as possible about the drone program as to where and why force was used, there
is a lot of uncertainty and unclear data on these statistics; It is evident that President Obama’s
administration has conducted more air strikes than the Bush administration which could be seen
as just a continuation or adoption of former President George W. Bush’s counterterrorism policy.
Throughout President Obama’s first and second terms, public support for the drone
program has remained high and steady. In Figure 7: they asked the public whether or not they
believed that the United States’ government should use drones to launch airstrikes in other
countries against suspected terrorists. A majority of the population, 65 percent, agreed that
drones should be used against suspected terrorists overseas, while 28 percent did not agree and 8
percent had no opinion. Figures 8 and 9 break down the polls into how many people support or
do not support these decisions based on how closely they follow the news on such topics.
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In Figure 8: the researchers asked the public, how closely they followed the news about
the United States government’s use of drones. 14 percent of the national adults said very closely,
35 percent said somewhat closely, 25 percent said not too closely, and 24 percent said not at all.
Figure 9 is based off of the results obtained in Figure 8. In Figure 9: Gallup asked the public,
based off of how closely they were following the news, about their support for drones in
different situations. The main question of focus is how many people supported the launch of
airstrikes in other countries against suspected terrorists. The results are broken down into 74
percent of those who followed the news very or somewhat closely agreed that airstrikes should
be used while 58 percent of those who did not follow the news too closely or not at all supported
the use of drones in this situation. Figure 10 reiterates everything that was shown in the last three
tables as well, that there was a majority of the public, 58 percent that supported the use of United
States drone strikes against extremists.
In Robert Putnam’s “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”
(1988), he said that the government has a responsibility of appeasing both the diplomats and the
domestic groups when it comes to foreign policy and international negotiations. According to
Putnam, domestic groups will pursue their interest by putting pressure on the government to
adopt policies that are ideal to the public and domestic groups (1988). If we look at the results
from Guantanamo Bay and the intervention in Libya, we can see, through the public opinion
polls, that the public indeed did put pressure on the government to see their most favorable
results but the government did not react in the publics’ favor.
Putnam states, “Involuntary defection instead reflects the behavior of an agent who is
unable to deliver on a promise because of failed ratification [of Level II]” (1988). Level II can
represent bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or even “public opinion” (1988).
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If we look at the results from Guantanamo Bay it verifies Putnam’s statement. President
Obama’s campaign promise to close Guantanamo Bay by the end of his first year in office was
halted because a majority of the American public and Congress disagreed with this policy
decision. Therefore, President Obama’s administration has not been able to move forward with
the closure of the Guantanamo Bay prison because of this stiff opposition, meaning that he has
not been able to fulfill or deliver his campaign promise to the public.
Further along in Putnam’s article he states, “The composition of the active Level II
constituency…also varies with the politicization of the issue…this is one reason why most
professional diplomats emphasize the value of secrecy to successful negotiations” (1988). This
idea can also be used to explain the situation between President Obama’s administration’s
continuation of the drone program and how the administration conveys the results of these
airstrikes to the public. If we look at the public opinion results of the drone program, they show
that the public is mainly in support of the use of drones against suspected terrorists. President
Obama’s administration has claimed that they have been as open and transparent with public on
the use of drones as much as they possibly can be. However, it is clear that the administration has
been secretive and non-transparent with the results of the drone strike because there are no clear
statistics on how many airstrikes have been launched, deaths of both civilians and suspected
terrorists, and who or what these strikes have targeted. This secrecy from the government can be
strategic to the administration because it is possible that if the public was aware of these statistics
that maybe they would not be as in favor of the drone program as they are without knowing the
exact statistics or details of the results of the program.
Another idea, in reference to Putnam’s paper, especially when looking at the intervention
in Libya, is that the United States has a certain image that the country wants to project and reflect
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internationally. For example, in President Obama’s arguments to get involved in Libya, the
president claimed that the United States is an anchor for global security and is an advocate for
global human freedom. With Putnam’s two-level domestic and international game in mind, it
could be taken into consideration that President Obama and his administration are attempting to
keep this international appearance afloat, even if that means having to go against the wishes and
demands of the domestic population.
Since public opinion was not a key factor in President Obama’s foreign policy decisionmaking process, President Obama’s policies did not meet Robert Putnam’s criteria of domestic
influence in the Two Level Game Theory. Putnam expects that the domestic level of the two
level game will ratify and support the decisions made at the international level, therefore
benefiting both levels of the game since both the domestic and the international levels would be
receiving what they bargained for. The cases of Guantanamo Bay and the intervention in Libya
supported the hypothesis because even though public opinion was strongly against closing the
prison and getting involved in the war in Libya, the Obama Administration continuously pursued
its support for these policies regardless of the public’s opinion and desires; therefore going
against the ideas of Putnam. With the drone program, there was strong support from the public
and internationally for using and continuing the drone program in fighting terrorism. Therefore,
the drone program is the only case where the support from the domestic level aligned with the
support from the international level, as predicted by Robert Putnam’s two level game theory.
There was strong international pressure on the United States government in the case of
Guantanamo Bay. Throughout my research, information was found where there were over
twenty countries, international organizations, and international diplomatic figures that directly
spoke out against the United States government for not having closed the detention facility.
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Therefore, President Obama was continuously pressured by international organizations and
actors to close Guantanamo Bay, there was also even more pressure because a lot of these
opposes claimed that the United States was hypocritical. Many argued that while the United
States is seen as an advocate for human rights and human freedoms worldwide, the government
was violating these very beliefs in their own detention facilities where they were torturing
detainees and stripping them of their rights, such as to a fair trial. Therefore, there was a lot of
pressure and strain placed on the United States government to close Guantanamo Bay from
international actors but there was stiff opposition from the domestic population in the United
States where a majority of the population wanted the camp to remain open and operational.
In the case of the Libyan intervention in 2011, there was a tremendous amount of
opposition from the United States citizens, as in they did not want to get involved in an Arab
civil war. However, there was a lot of pressure from the international sectors. France and Great
Britain were the spearheads of the campaign in Libya; the two countries have a lot of
opportunities to pressure the United States into involvement considering all three countries are
members of the U.N. Security Council and NATO. The French government was relentless in
getting the United States to participate; the former President Nicolas Sarkozy consistently called
out the United States for being too vague in their position in the opposition. There was also a lot
of pressure coming from the Arab League, a twenty-two member organization, even though at
the time there was twenty-one because Libya was excluded during the time of the Libyan civil
war. There was this expectation of the United States getting involved because of the
humanitarian violations that were being committed in Libya at the time and considering that the
United States actively advocates for human rights, it was only expected for the United States to
willing jump in, but that was not the case.
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The drone program is the only case where Robert Putnam’s case is proven because here
there is a strong support at home and internationally. As it was hard to find information on
President Obama’s administration’s use of drones and airstrikes throughout his first term, this
study focused on the use of drones in the Syrian civil war in the fight against President Assad
and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. This was a U.S.-led campaign and there was strong
support from the citizens in the United States and support from countries internationally to use
drones to fight terrorism and an oppressive regime. In this case rather than there being strong
pressures on the United States to get involved, there were strong pressures on foreign countries,
especially some of the Gulf States, to get involved on behalf of the United States. Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar are all strategically located countries for the
United States and it is important that there remains good relationships between the U.S. and
these Gulf States as they both rely on one another for military, counterterrorism, and stability
purposes. These four countries were easily susceptible to potential terrorism threats at home and
instability and the United States provides these countries with the support and counterbalance in
the Middle East that they need therefore, it is important that they support and do what the United
States feels is best for the region.

Conclusion
While public opinion did not have a major influence on President Barack Obama’s
foreign policy decisions when it comes to the “closing” of Guantanamo Bay, the United States’
intervention in Libya, and the continuation of the drone program, there were strong international
pressures placed on the United States and other countries that influenced the government’s
decisions. Therefore, in two out of the three cases Robert Putnam’s theory was not supported
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because while the international level was supportive of the policies, the public was not,
especially in the case of Guantanamo Bay where neither the public nor Congress would approve
of President Obama’s decision to close the facility. It could be argued in future research that
since there is belief by scholars that the there is an overall lack in understanding of how public
opinion affects American foreign policy because the public is disengaged and uneducated on
foreign issues and that the role of media influences the public’s attitude towards a certain issue,
then there is no need to let the public’s opinion on foreign policy determine diplomacy and to
just focus on the international context of diplomacy.
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